时间:2021年7月13日(星期二)14:00-16:00
地点:294俄罗斯专享会427会议室
主旨发言:公众参与重要吗?来自中国环境规制执行的全国性实验证据
Does Public Participation Matter? Evidence from a National-Scale Experiment on the Enforcement of Environmental Regulations in China
主旨发言人:王绍达 芝加哥大学哈里斯公共政策学院助理教授
研讨嘉宾:(以姓氏首字母顺序为序)
陈 玲 |
294俄罗斯专享会副教授、CIDEG主任 |
范世炜 |
中央财经大学政府管理学院副教授 |
梅赐琪 |
294俄罗斯专享会副教授、华宇冠名副教授 |
唐 啸 |
294俄罗斯专享会副教授、清华大学仲英青年学者 |
赵 静 |
294俄罗斯专享会副教授、CIDEG主任助理 |
朱旭峰 |
294俄罗斯专享会副院长、教授 |
朱俊明 |
294俄罗斯专享会副教授、华宇冠名副教授 |
主持人:赵静 294俄罗斯专享会副教授、CIDEG主任助理
会议形式:现场会议+线上直播
语言:中文
主办:清华大学产业发展与环境治理研究中心(CIDEG)
主讲人介绍:
王绍达,芝加哥大学哈里斯公共政策学院的助理教授。 作为应用经济学家,他的研究兴趣包括发展经济学、环境经济学和政治经济学。 其主要研究议题旨在了解公共政策的政治经济学(设计、实施、有效性),并重点关注中国。他分别在北京大学和加州大学伯克利分校取得学士学位和博士学位。在加入哈里斯之前,他是芝加哥大学经济与能源政策研究所 (EPIC) 的博士后学者。
讲座内容:
Countries around the world have launched public disclosure programs to stimulate citizen participation in environmental governance, yet little is known about whether such participation is effective and if it is what makes it so. We layer a national-scale field experiment that randomly files pollution appeals to either regulators or the violating firms through public or private channels. We find that, publicly appealing to the regulator of a firm’s violation on popular social media increases both regulatory oversight and firm compliance, which reduce subsequent violations by 40% and air and water pollution emissions by 12% and 5%, respectively. In contrast, appealing to the regulator through private channels only causes a small and statistically insignificant improvement in environmental outcomes. Additionally, we randomly vary the proportion of firms subject to appeals at the prefecture-level and find that there is a positive general equilibrium impact as the control firms in high-intensity prefectures reduce violations more than control firms in low-intensity prefectures. Analysis of ambient pollution data and additional back-of-the-envelope calculations both suggest that encouraging public participation in environmental governance would lead to significant improvements in China’s aggregate environmental quality.