Why do some politicians tolerate the violation of the law? In contexts where the poor are the primary violators of property laws in electoral democracies, I argue that the answer lies in the electoral costs of enforcement: enforcement can decrease support from poor voters even while it generates support among nonpoor voters. Using an original dataset on unlicensed street vending and enforcement operations at the subcity district level in three Latin American capital cities, I show that the combination of voter demographics and electoral rules explains enforcement. Supported by qualitative interviews, these findings suggest how the intentional non-enforcement of law, or forbearance, can be an electoral strategy. Dominant theories based on state capacity poorly explain the results.

     Alisha Holland is a junior fellow at the Society of Fellows at Harvard University. She received her Ph.D. in political science from Harvard University. Her work looks at the comparative political economy of development with a focus on urban politics, regulatory enforcement, and Latin America. Her research has appeared or is forthcoming in American Journal of Political Science and Latin American Research Review.